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Financial 
Performance 
a Guarantees 
The State of Practice 
Wayne M. Feiden, Raymond J. Burby, and 
Edward J. Kaiser 
Financial performance guarantees are tools for 
ensuring that funds needed to pay for improve- 
ments called for by development permits and a p  
provals are available in the event a developer de- 
faults on permit requirements. Once limited to 
surety bonds and cash escrows, new types of 
guarantees have been developed and are coming 
into common use. Standby letters of credit, in 
particular, are being used more widely and have 
a number of advantages. To use guarantees suc- 
cessfully, municipal governments must make 
careful decisions about a number of administra- 
tive matters. Evidence from 309 municipalities 
reported in this article can help local planners 
make the right choices. 
Feiden is an environmental planner with the city of 
Northampton, Massachusetts. Burby and Kaiser, editors 
of this journal from 1983 to 1988, are professors of plan- 
ning in the Department of City and Regional Planning, 
University of North Carolina at  Chapel Hill. 
Financial performance guarantees are designed to en- 
sure that funds needed to complete public and private 
improvements required by local ordinances or devel- 
opment approvals are available in the event of a devel- 
oper’s default or bankruptcy. Guarantees create legal and 
financial incentives for developers to perform work re- 
quired as a condition for issuance of permits, and they 
make it easier for governments to finish such work if  a 
default occurs. When properly designed, they also con- 
tribute to a number of other obiectives. Thev can make 
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administration of land use and environmental regulations 
easier and more eficient, reduce the frequency and ex- 
pense of litigation, provide protection for consumers 
purchasing property in new projects, and, importantly, 
allow communities to be more flexible in responding to 
developers’ needs for more time to complete infrastruc- 
ture after occupancy permits are issued or to delay com- 
pletion of landscaping until weather conditions are fa- 
vorable. 
Performance guarantees have long been used in local 
subdivision regulation, where they are “an esoteric but 
important part of the planning process” (Rogal 1974), 
but not much is known about local governments’ expe- 
rience with them here or in other regulatory areas. In 
this article, we describe the frequency with which finan- 
cial performance guarantees and accompanying admin- 
istrative forms and techniques are used in the United 
States, and we draw on local Dlanners’ exDerience and 
perceptions to indicate which approaches to guarantees 
and their administration seem to be working best in actual 
practice. Our information expands and updates the only 
previous survey of the use of guarantees (Seidel 1978), 
and it provides planners interested in adopting or revising 
their financial performance guarantees with feedback 
from practical experience that they can use to augment 
various commentators’ words of wisdom (e.g., American 
Law Institute 1976; Freilich and Levi 1975; Kelley and 
Schultz 1988; Mandelker 1982; Rogal 1974; Schultz and 
Kelley 1985; Yearwood 197 1). 
The data for this article come from questionnaires re- 
turned by planners working in 309 municipalities across 
the United States. The survey, completed during the 
summer of 1988, was sent to a random sample of 500 
municipalities with populations between 15,000 and 
500,000.’ Although planners working in communities 
that use financial guarantees may be slightly overrep- 
resented in our data, since they are more likely to be 
interested in the topic and thus to have returned a ques- 
tionnaire, we believe the sample size and response rate 
(62 percent) are high enough for readers to have confi- 
dence in our findingsS2 Also, comparison of the distri- 
bution of responding and nonresponding municipalities 
reveals no significant differences between respondents 
and nonrespondents by region or p~pula t ion .~  
How Guarantees Are Used 
The survey confirmed that subdivision regulations au- 
thorize the use of financial performance guarantees far 
more frequently than do any other municipal regulations 
(Table 1). That practice is reflected in the literature as 
well, which discusses almost exclusively the use of guar- 
antees as a tool for obtaining compliance with subdivision 
regulations (e.g., Kelley and Schultz 1988; Rogal 1974). 
The survey also revealed, however, that financial per- 
formance guarantees now are used for a wide variety of 
other land use and environmental regulations as well. A 
substantial minority of jurisdictions (between 17 percent 
and 30 percent) write performance guarantees into zon- 
ing, stormwater, erosionlsedimentation, and on-site 
sewage regulations. In those jurisdictions, guarantees 
were required for a substantial (but minority) proportion 
of the total number of the permits issued for each type 
of regulation during the last full year of record. 
Traditionally, local governments have used financial 
performance guarantees to ensure the completion of im- 
provements to be dedicated to the public. Many of the 
improvements required by subdivision, zoning, erosion 
control, stormwater, and on-site sewage regulations, 
however, are not dedicated to the public but instead re- 
main in private ownership (these include such improve- 
ments as landscaping, storm drainage facilities in com- 
mercial and apartment projects, and septic tanks). A ma- 
jority of the communities (56 percent) use financial 
guarantees in some cases to ensure that required im- 
provements which will be privately owned are built to 
specified standards and are completed before a project 
is occupied. 
Types of Guarantees 
Several types of financial performance guarantees are 
available to local governments. Performance (surety) 
bonds and cash escrows are described most frequently 
in the literature, but other options are also available and 
are commonly used. These include property escrows, 
standby letters of credit, improvement credit agreements, 
and liens and covenants. We will describe each of these 
briefly and then examine the frequency with which they 
are being used. 
Performance Bonds 
Where a performance bond serves as the guarantee, a 
surety company agrees to pay the value of the bond to a 
local government (the obligee) if  a developer (the prin- 
TABLE 1:  Use of financial performance guar- 
antees with regulations 
Municipalities Permits 
using financial issued 
performance with a 
guarantees to guarantee 
ensure compliance required 
Type of regulation with regulation ("/o) ("N 
Subdivision 76 70 
Stormwater 28 27 
Erosion/sedimentation control 23 27 
Zoning 30 33 
On-site sewage 17 21 
cipal) defaults on the permit conditions. The greater assets 
of a surety company assure the local government that 
the financial resources will be there to complete required 
improvements. Performance bonds have some similarities 
to insurance, because the surety company is taking some 
risk and surety exists to reduce the risk to local govern- 
ment. But, unlike the conditions with insurance, the risk 
is not spread widely, and as a result, surety companies 
take only limited risks. Because of that, performance 
bonds can be difficult or impossible for small or new 
companies to obtain (Seidel 1978). For larger developers 
with collateral, however, obtaining a performance bond 
at a reasonable premium has not been difficult (Rogal 
1974). 
If a developer is in danger of default, a surety company 
may assist in completing required improvements, possibly 
by loaning the developer required funds, if that might 
avoid greater liability. Once a developer defaults, a surety 
company has several options: it can finance completion 
of the project by the original developer and, if the project 
is a success, recover its capital; it can hire a new con- 
tractor to finish the project: or it can pay off the bond 
principal. If the surety company takes an option other 
than paying off the face value of the bond directly to 
local government, its liability may exceed the amount of 
the bond. 
Most commentators believe that surety companies 
would rather pay off a bond than follow the first two 
courses of action (Schroeder 1982; Webster 1982; Schultz 
and Kelley 1985). Our data indicate, however, that surety 
companies are somewhat more likely to arrange to have 
an improvement completed than to pay local govern- 
ments the amount of the bond. Thirty-four percent of the 
municipalities we surveyed reported that, when devel- 
opers defaulted, the surety company gave them the funds, 
40 percent said the surety company arranged to have the 
improvement completed, 16 percent reported both ex- 
periences, and 10 percent reported a variety of other 
outcomes. 
Schultz and Kelley (1985) argue that, while perfor- 
mance surety bonds are better than no guarantee, they 
are the least preferable of the financial guarantees avail- 
able because local governments often have to go to court 
to collect (and, they argue, surety bonds add an unrea- 
sonable cost for the developer, most of which is passed 
on to consumers). Rritt (1982) agrees that some claims 
may be settled for less than the full principal, but he 
argues that most surety companies pay claims in full and 
that few cases go to court. Our data indicate that mu- 
nicipalities using surety bonds are neither more likely 
nor less likely than municipalities using other types of 
financial performance guarantees to have to go to court 
to settle claims. Twenty-one percent using surety bonds 
went to court one or more times between 1983 and 1988, 
while 20 percent using other types of guarantees and not 
using surety bonds went to court during that time.4 
Cash Escrows 
A cash escrow is a special bank or other third party 
account that can be converted readily to a specified sum 
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of money. Usually, only local government can authorize 
release of,the money to a permit holder, in accordance 
with terms of the escrow. The government also can col- 
lect the money if it declares that a developer has defaulted 
on specified permit obligations. Traditionally, escrows 
are the second-most-common form of financial perfor- 
mance guarantee after surety performance bonds. For 
many years bonds and cash escrows were the only per- 
formance guarantees authorized in many communities. 
Cash escrows are unpopular with developers, since 
they are very costly if required for the full value of im- 
provements plus a margin of safety and are not released 
until after the improvement has been completed. In order 
to avoid the need for double funding of improvements, 
escrow agreements often allow either partial release of 
funds to developers after completion of each required 
improvement and assurance that there are no unpaid bills, 
or release of funds to subcontractors to complete required 
improvements. When partial disbursements are made, 
governments may reduce the risk of having to declare a 
developer in default, but they expose themselves to the 
risk of financial shortfalls if escrow accounts are ex- 
hausted before all required improvements are installed 
(Seidel 1978; Schultz and Kelley 1985). That potential 
can be offset to some extent, however, if interest on es- 
crow funds is accumulated in the account and added to 
the principal amount (McPherson 1974). 
Property Escrows 
Property escrows are structured in the same way as 
cash escrows, but instead of cash, real property, such as 
land, buildings and improvements, or personal property 
in the form of stocks, bonds, or equipment is placed in 
escrow. Property escrows have a number of disadvan- 
tages. They involve valuation of property, assurance that 
property is free of liens, and, if  a default occurs, the time 
and bother of marketing property to obtain funds required 
to complete improvements. Because of those disadvan- 
tages local governments have avoided property escrows 
(Seidel 1978). 
Standby Letters of Credit 
A standby letter of credit is an agreement by a bank 
or other financial institution to pay specified sums of 
money to a third party, such as a local government, in 
the event a developer defaults on responsibilities to com- 
plete required improvements to standards and on sched- 
ule, as specified in the terms of the letter. The borrower 
(e.g., a developer) agrees to repay the bank in a separate 
agreement. 
Developers tend to favor letters of credit because they 
are less expensive and more readily available than surety 
bonds, while they do not require the outlay of capital 
required by escrows. Standby letters of credit appeal to 
local governments as well because they ensure the avail- 
ability of funds if a developer defaults, and they provide 
a simple mechanism for collecting the funds (a govern- 
ment presents the bank with documentation of default). 
Improvement Credit Agreements 
An improvement credit agreement is a three-party 
agreement between a developerlborrower, a bank, and 
a local government in which the bank agrees to pay for 
improvements as they are completed if  the local govern- 
ment accepts the improvement. Unlike the case of a 
standby letter of credit, which is used only if  developers 
default on their obligations, the developer and the local 
government authorize the bank to make payments to the 
developer and subcontractors as required improvements 
are made. Improvement credit agreements ensure that 
money is available to make required improvements and 
that local governments will have an opportunity to ap- 
prove those improvements before funds are dispersed. 
Because money is dispersed incrementally, there is more 
risk to local governments than with standby letters of 
credit, since the line of credit could be exhausted before 
all improvements are made. 
Liens/Covenants 
Although not technically financial performance guar- 
antees, liens or covenants can be placed by local gov- 
ernments on a property being developed to record an 
encumbrance on the property. The liens remain in effect 
until the necessary improvements have been made and 
approved. If a developer defaults on the improvements, 
local governments can initiate foreclosure proceedings. 
Liens remain with the property if i t  is transferred and 
help ensure that future owners are aware of the nature 
of the encumbrance. 
If a developer goes bankrupt because there are usually 
other liens and mortgages on property being developed, 
the cash value of the local government claim may be 
very limited; thus, the main purpose of the lien is to clarify 
the encumbrance for future owners and to minimize the 
danger of a solvent developer refusing to build an im- 
provement to required standards. 
Frequency. of Use 
In 1976, Seidel(1978) surveyed 80 local governments 
and found that 96 percent used performance or improve- 
ment bonds, 7 1 percent cash escrow accounts, 9 percent 
real property escrow accounts, and 6 percent letters of 
credit. He did not ask about the use of improvement 
credit agreements or liens. We found, 12 years later, that 
bonds continue to be the most frequently used financial 
guarantees (Table 2). We also found that there has been 
a dramatic increase in the use of letters of credit, which 
are authorized for use by a majority of local governments 
and now actually are used in practice more frequently 
than cash escrows (see the right-hand column of Table 
2), even though they are still not authorized by enabling 
legislation as frequently as cash escrows. We believe that 
this increase stems from the ease and relatively low cost 
of obtaining letters of credit and, to a lesser extent, be- 
cause local governments increasingly are encouraging 
developers to use letters of credit rather than performance 
improvement bonds. Governments continue to use real 
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TABLE 2: Frequency of use of 
guarantees 
performance 
Municipalities 
authorized 
to use the 
guarantee 
Type of guarantee ("4 
Permits that 
included a 
guarantee' 
(average per 
municipality) 
("/.) 
Performance or improvement 
bond 78 43 
Cash escrow 66 16 
Letter of credit 59 36 
Improvement credit agreement 18 2 
Lien on development 13 3 
escrow 6 1 
Noncash and real property 
flexible limits enable local governments to allow large, 
phased developments several years to finish a project 
while not being forced to allow the same amount of time 
for smaller projects that reasonably can be completed in 
a matter of months. Among jurisdictions with inflexible 
time limits, the vast majority allow developers from one 
to two years after permit issuance to complete required 
improvements (see Table 3.) In most cases, however, time 
limits can be renewed at the discretion of the municipality 
(89 percent of the municipalities surveyed) or by the de- 
veloper as a matter of right (8 percent of the municipal- 
TABLE 3: Requirements imposed by perfor- 
mance guarantees 
a. Over the past 5 years. 
Guarantee characteristics 
property escrows infrequently, but a larger, although still 
small, proportion of governments are using improvement 
credit agreements and liens. 
Structure and Time Limits 
Municipalities may establish guidelines regarding the 
type of improvements (permanent or temporary) for 
which financial guarantees are required, time limits for 
the completion of improvements, and whether warranties 
of performance after an improvement is completed will 
be required. Our data indicate that local practices vary 
widely across municipalities (Table 3). Permanent im- 
provements include most of those dedicated to the public, 
such as roads and sewers, as well as many improvements, 
such as landscaping and permanent erosion-control 
structures, that will remain in private hands after con- 
struction is completed. Temporary improvements, such 
as temporary erosion control devices, usually remain in 
private ownership and are no longer required at the end 
of the construction process. Financial guarantees are far 
more common for permanent improvements than for 
temporary ones because permanent improvements are 
more numerous, often have greater impact, and are more 
likely to be dedicated to the public. Nevertheless, guar- 
antees are important in both cases, since the damage due 
to failure to provide a needed temporary improvement, 
such as erosion control, can be substantial and long 
lasting. 
Municipalities using financial performance guarantees 
give developers a specified period of time within which 
to complete required improvements. At the expiration 
of the time limit, developers can be declared in default, 
and the municipality can use guarantee funds to complete 
the improvement. A sizable minority of the municipalities 
we surveyed (37 percent for permanent improvements 
and 47 percent for temporary improvements) use flexible 
time limits, varying the time allowed to complete im- 
provements with the size of development projects. Such 
Municipalities 
(among those 
using guarantees) 
("4 
Type of improvement for which a 
guarantee is required 
Permanent improvements 
Temporary improvements 
Time limit for completing improvement 
Permanent improvements 
Less than 6 months 
6-11 months 
12-24 months 
More than 24 months 
Varies with project size 
Temporary improvements 
Less than 6 months 
6-11 months 
12-24 months 
More than 24 months 
Varies with project size 
Improvement completion after 
issuance of certificate of 
occupancy 
Not allowed 
Allowed 
Improvements to be privately owned 
Private landscaping 
Private paving projects 
Private on-site sewage systems 
Other private improvements 
Improvements to be dedicated to the 
public 
Maintenancelperformance warranty 
Not required 
Required 
Length of warranty 
Less than 12 months 
12-24 months 
More than 24 months 
Varies with project size 
99 
69 
2 
12 
41 
9 
37 
8 
13 
32 
1 
47 
31 
69 
47 
28 
4 
29 
27 
19 
81 
20 
63 
5 
13 
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ities surveyed). Only 3 percent of the jurisdictions we 
surveyed prohibit extensions of time limits. 
For some types of required improvements, many mu- 
nicipalities (69 percent of those surveyed) will issue cer- 
tificates of occupancy before required improvements are 
completed. Almost half of the municipalities with per- 
formance guarantees, for example, will issue certificates 
of occupancy before privately owned landscaping has 
been completed: about a quarter (28 percent) do the same 
for privately owned paving projects. Similarly, about a 
quarter of the municipalities allow developers to occupy 
projects before they complete improvements to be ded- 
icated to the public. 
More than four out of every five municipalities (81 
percent) using financial performance guarantees author- 
ize or require maintenance warranties for at least some 
improvements. Those warranties most commonly are re- 
quired for 12 to 24 months after completion of the im- 
provement (see Table 3). 
Costing and Releasing of Guarantees 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Two of the most difficult tasks of administering finan- 
cial performance guarantees are costing and releasing 
guarantees. Costing is the process of establishing the 
minimum dollar amount that the permittee must guar- 
antee. The amount should be large enough to cover the 
cost of the improvements the municipality would have 
to provide if the developer defaults, but at the same time 
it should not be so large that it creates an unreasonable 
or illegal burden on permittees. Most communities (67 
percent) use their own expertise in estimating the cost 
of improvements. Some (29 percent) use data from permit 
applicants to estimate costs, and some (21 percent) use 
actual contractors’ bids (Table 4). 
Municipalities generally (65 percent of those we sur- 
veyed) require that financial guarantees cover the entire 
estimated cost of required improvements. A quarter of 
those we surveyed have a flexible policy, sometimes re- 
quiring a financial performance guarantee for the full 
cost of an improvement and sometimes not, and 10 per- 
cent require a guarantee for only part of the estimated 
cost of the improvement. In addition, a majority of mu- 
nicipalities (68 percent) add a margin of safety to their 
estimates to account for inflation and the possibility of 
underestimation of costs. Among municipalities adding 
a margin of safety, 5 1 percent add from 1 to 10 percent 
to cost estimates, 23 percent add from 1 1  to 20 percent, 
and 17 percent add 20  percent or more. For 9 percent 
of the municipalities the exact amount of the margin of 
safety was not determined. 
In order to reduce project costs, developers may re- 
quest that municipalities release them from financial 
guarantees in stages as the project progresses. Sixty-one 
percent of the municipalities responding to our survey 
allow staged release of guarantee funds, but most also 
keep back some funds until all improvements are com- 
pleted. The percent of the entire guarantee retained until 
completion varies among municipalities with a few (5 
TABLE 4: Costing and releasing financial per- 
formance guarantees 
Municipalities 
Municipal practice (”@ 
Costing 
Source of improvementcost estimate 
Municipal engineer 
Permit administrator 
Permit applicant 
Subcontractors’ bids 
Other 
Margin of safety 
None added 
1-10 percent 
1 1  -20 percent 
21-30 percent 
31 percent or more 
35 
32 
29 
21 
7 
32 
33 
16 
7 
12 
Releasing 
Staged release of funds 
Not used 39 
used 61 
Percent of funds held until completion 
1-10 percent 57 
20 percent or more 21 
1 1  -1 9 percent 16 
Varies 16 
Check for liens on the improvement by subcon- 
tractors and others before accepting 
dedication 
Sometimes or never 35 
Always 65 
percent) holding back as much as 40 percent of the guar- 
antee amount. The most common practice (among 57 
percent of municipalities), however, is to hold back 10 
percent or less of the guarantee until final completion of 
all required improvements. 
Before accepting dedicated improvements, municipal- 
ities should check to ensure that all payments have been 
made to subcontractors and that there are no liens on 
the improvement. Actual practice, however, sometimes 
differs from recommended practice. Thirty-five percent 
of the municipalities we surveyed report that they do not 
always check for liens before accepting dedications and 
releasing guarantees. 
Enforcement and Collection 
Financial performance guarantees decrease the chance 
that a municipality will find it necessary to use public 
funds to complete unfinished improvements or to recon- 
struct improvements that have design or construction 
defects. If guarantees are difficult to collect, however, 
they fail to achieve their purpose. 
Municipalities use several techniques to check for 
compliance with their regulations and to determine if 
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enforcement actions are necessary. Almost every mu- 
nicipality (98 percent) relies heavily on staff inspections. 
A majority of municipalities (69 percent), however, also 
require external professional certification in at least some 
of their regulations or for some types of projects (e.g., 
larger projects). While an applicant’s consultant’s certi- 
fication is more likely to be biased than a municipal in- 
spection, an outside professional can inspect many as- 
pects of a project in more detail than staff has time to 
undertake. In recognition of that consideration and to 
avoid the bias possible when developers pay for profes- 
sional certification, a number of municipalities (29 per- 
cent) choose the consultant to perform needed inspec- 
tions. 
If a project is found to be out of compliance with mu- 
nicipal regulations or permit provisions, municipalities 
have a number of options for obtaining compliance before 
calling in financial guarantees. In order of the percentage 
of municipalities authorized to use them, these options 
include withholding the occupancy permit (93 percent 
of municipalities): seeking civil penalties (83 percent): 
withholding other permits for the same project (57 per- 
cent); seeking injunctive relief (49 percent): seeking 
criminal remedies (40 percent): withholding sequential 
permits for other lots in the same development (38 per- 
cent): and withholding permits for unrelated projects by 
the same developer (9 percent) (Table 5). 
In spite of these options, 40 percent of the municipal- 
ities we surveyed declared one or more developers in 
default of a financial guarantee between 1983 and 1988. 
Of that number, 39 percent said that after calling the 
guarantee there always were enough funds to pay for 
required improvements, 5 1 percent said there sometimes 
were enough funds, and 10 percent reported there never 
were enough funds from the guarantees to cover costs. 
One of the reasons that guarantees are not always ad- 
equate to pay for improvements is that, if a permittee is 
bankrupt, other creditors may attempt to collect the 
guaranteed funds and may have access to those funds 
before the municipality. While this rarely happens, 17 
percent of the municipalities that have attempted to col- 
lect on financial guarantees report at least one experience 
where creditors collected some of the money before the 
municipality. Cash escrows have been accessed by cred- 
itors most frequently (this has happened in 59 percent of 
the cases where attempts were made by other creditors), 
because they represent direct assets of the permittee that 
can be attached. In the other cases where guarantees 
were accessed by creditors, 35 percent were using surety 
bonds, 18 percent were using improvement credits, and 
6 percent were using property escrows. Letters of credit, 
i f  properly written, are impossible for creditors to draw 
on because they represent an obligation of a bank to a 
municipality, not an obligation of the permittee. Hence, 
none of the municipalities that lost funds to other cred- 
itors was using a letter of credit as a guarantee. 
Although in theory each type of financial guarantee 
can be collected without going to court, obstacles do 
arise, particularly when there are other creditors or when 
TABLE 5: Enforcement and collection of guar- 
antees 
Municipalities 
Municipal practice (“4 
Sanctions to secure compliance with 
Occupancy permit withheld 
Civil penalties 
Other permits for the same property withheld 
Injunctive relief 
Criminal remedies 
Sequential permits withheld for bts in the same 
Permits for the same developer on unrelated 
regulations 
development 
developments withheld 
Calling in of financial performance 
None called 
Bonds 
Letters of credit 
Cash escrows 
Improvement credit agreement 
Property escrow 
Adequacy of performance guarantee funds 
to finish improvements when 
developers have defaulted 
guarantees between 1983 and 1988 
Always enough funds 
Sometimes enough funds 
Never enough funds 
Creditors’ accessing of funds before 
Has not occurred 
municipality 
Has OCCUNed 
Type of guarantee used 
Cash escrows 
Surety bonds 
Improvement credit agreements 
Property escrows 
Letters of credit 
93 
83 
57 
49 
40 
38 
9 
60 
23 
20 
17 
2 
1 
39 
51 
10 
83 
17 
59 
35 
18 
6 
0 
guarantee language is unclear or ambiguous. Between 
1983 and 1988, 20 percent of the municipalities we sur- 
veyed that declared developers in default and attempted 
to collect on improvement guarantees went to court to 
enforce the guarantee. That represents a total of 54 court 
cases (5 of the 29 municipalities that declared developers 
in default and went to court did not report the number 
of cases). Presumably other cases have been settled out 
of court. In addition, the costs of litigation probably dis- 
courage some municipalities from taking legal action. 
Nevertheless it appears that the administration of finan- 
cial performance guarantees results in only limited liti- 
gation. The percentage of municipalities using financial 
guarantees that resorted to court action to collect a guar- 
antee between 1983 and 1988 was as follows: property 
escrows, 1 1 percent: lienslcovenants, 14 percent; surety 
bonds, 21 percent; cash escrows, 23 percent: letters of 
APA JOURNAL 491 AUTUMN 1989 
WAYNE M. FEIDEN, RAYMOND J. BURBY, A N D  EDWARD J. KAISER 
credit, 25 percent; and improvement credit agreements, 
32 percent. 
Planners’ Evaluations 
When asked to sum up their overall experience with 
financial performance guarantees, 90 percent of the 
planners responding to our survey evaluated them as ei- 
ther very effective tools (58 percent) or somewhat effec- 
tive tools (32 percent) for ensuring compliance with reg- 
ulations. Community size has little association with per- 
ceived effectiveness, but effectiveness ratings do vary by 
type of guarantee used and other guarantee character- 
istics. 
Planners are more likely to be pleased with the overall 
effectiveness of performance guarantees when their mu- 
nicipality is using surety bonds, cash escrows, and/or 
letters of credit. Significantly lower overall effectiveness 
ratings accompany the use of real property escrows, liens, 
and improvement credit agreements (less than 80 percent 
of the municipalities rate their use of guarantees as very 
or somewhat effective). Planners rate financial perfor- 
mance guarantees as more effective in achieving com- 
pliance with regulations under the following conditions: 
when agreements are set to cover the entire cost of an 
improvement; when higher margins of safety are used in 
estimating costs; when the municipality always checks 
for liens before accepting dedication of improvements; 
and when creditors have not been able to access the 
funds. 
Municipalities have found that permittees generally 
do not find financial performance guarantees unreason- 
ably onerous. Less than 1 in 20 of the municipalities we 
surveyed said they had received “many” complaints from 
developers. In part, that may stem from the relatively 
low cost of the guarantees to the development commu- 
nity. Eighty-five percent of the municipalities surveyed 
estimate that guarantees cost developers 2.5 percent or 
less of total project costs, and 23 percent put the cost to 
developers at less than 1 percent of total project costs. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In actual practice, financial performance guarantees 
are an effective, although not infallible, means of ensuring 
that improvements required as a condition for issuing 
development permits and approvals will be built to spec- 
ified standards if the permittee defaults. They are being 
used widely and successfully by both large and small 
municipalities throughout the United States, not only in 
subdivision regulations, but also in other regulatory pro- 
grams that require developers to construct on- and off- 
site improvements, and they appear to be accepted by 
the development community. 
Financial guarantees seem to be useful not only for 
improvements dedicated to the public but also for those 
that remain in private ownership after completion of de- 
velopment. Thus, they provide a degree of consumer 
protection in the development process. When improper 
installation of privately owned facilities has the potential 
to threaten public health, as is the case with septic tank 
installations, they benefit the general public as well. 
Although municipalities can choose among a variety 
of types of financial performance guarantees, experience 
in actual practice suggests that a relatively new form of 
guarantee for municipalities-standby letters of credit- 
has a number of advantages, not the least of which is 
reduced exposure to loss of guarantee funds to other 
creditors. Survey data reported here indicate that there 
has been a substantial increase in the use of letters of 
credit over the past decade. In contrast to that trend, 
surety bonds and cash escrows are becoming less dom- 
inant. Surety bonds may be difficult for small and un- 
dercapitalized developers to obtain, and cash escrows 
are readily accessible to other creditors in the event a 
developer declares bankruptcy. 
We recommend that municipalities that are not using 
financial guarantees give careful consideration to the 
adoption of this tool for ensuring compliance with de- 
velopment regulations, and that municipalities using 
guarantees for some programs, such as subdivision reg- 
ulations, consider their use in others, such as zoning, 
stormwater management, erosion and sedimentation 
control, and wetland regulations, areas where guarantees 
are not commonly used at this time. 
We also recommend that letters of credit be authorized 
whenever any financial guarantee is allowed or required. 
Letters of credit generally provide the best protection for 
a municipality because they represent an obligation of a 
bank that is independent of a developer’s financial situ- 
ation, and they are relatively easy for developers to ob- 
tain. Letters of credit, however, may lack the flexibility 
of some other types of guarantees. Thus, we also rec- 
ommend that municipalities authorize use of a variety of 
types of guarantees. Large developers, for example, might 
find that surety bonds are easily obtainable, while small 
developers, who cannot obtain a surety bond, neverthe- 
less might have the capital to put up a cash escrow. 
In conclusion, financial performance guarantees are a 
powerful tool, and are being used in an increasing number 
of local government regulatory programs. They are ap- 
propriate in all communities. They can improve compli- 
ance with local regulations and reduce court costs for 
local governments, and they can assure consumers and 
the community as a whole that development meets local 
standards for the quality of the built environment. 
NOTES 
1 .  We obtained the sample frame for the local govern- 
ment survey from Municipal/County Executive Di- 
rectory/ 1987 (Carroll Publishing). We did not survey 
jurisdictions with populations below 1 5,000 because, 
although there is a very large number of them, they 
represent a small proportion of the US. population. 
Their inclusion in the random sample would have 
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skewed the sample toward very small places. That 
might have been handled by drawing a stratified sam- 
ple, but we believed the advantage in an ability to 
generalize to a larger universe was more than offset 
by the more cumbersome data analysis and reporting 
that inclusion of smaller jurisdictions would have en- 
tailed. We excluded cities of 500,000 or more people 
(of which there are 23 in the United States) from the 
sample frame because they represent a small category 
of local governments and have regulatory approaches 
and planning problems that tend to be unique. 
2. The 309 municipalities represented in the data re- 
ported here constitute 16 percent of the 1,881 mu- 
nicipalities in the United States with populations be- 
tween 15,000 and 500,000. Confidence intervals 
around the proportions reported in this article vary 
depending upon whether data represent the entire 
sample of 309 cities or  a subgroup of those cities. The 
broadest confidence intervals (at the 95-percent level 
of confidence) range from +/- 5.6 percent for re- 
sponses to dichotomous questions (e.g., use or nonuse 
of performance guarantees and various administrative 
measures), with a 50 percent/50 percent split in re- 
sponses and all 309 cities represented, to +/- 10 per- 
cent with 96 cities represented (the smallest subgroup 
for which data are reported). Those confidence inter- 
vals narrow the larger the subgroup and the more 
that proportions vary from a 50 percent/fiO percent 
split toward a 0 percent/ 100 percent split in responses 
to dichotomous questions. 
3. Of the municipalities that returned questionnaires and 
are represented in the data reported here, 54 percent 
have populations between 15,000 and 29,999: 30 
percent have populations between 30,000 and 59,999; 
and 16 percent have populations of 60,000 or more. 
We note, however, that among the cities surveyed, 
we could find no systematic differences between larger 
and smaller cities in the use and administration of 
financial guarantees. 
4. Those results have to be viewed with some caution, 
however, since municipalities often use a variety of 
types of guarantees, and we did not ask specifically if 
court action was related to a surety bond or to another 
type of guarantee. Thus, i t  is possible (although its 
seems improbable) that the municipalities using surety 
bonds that reported court action during the past five 
years to collect on a performance guarantee could 
have gone to court to collect on other types of guar- 
antees than surety bonds. 
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